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Abstract
This paper investigated the impact of prolonged terrorist activities on stock prices
of different sectors listed in Karachi Stock Exchange by using newly developed terror-
ism impact factor index with lingering effect (TIFL) and monthly time series data from
2002(Jan) to 2011(Dec). Johansen and Jeuselius cointegration revealed long run relation-
ship between terrorism and stock price. Normalized cointegration vectors are used to test
the effect of terrorism on stock price. Results demonstrated significantly mixed positive
and negative impact of prolonged terrorism on stock prices of different sectors and have
shown that market has not become insensitive to the prolonged terrorist attacks.
JEL classification codes:G01,G11,G12,G15,G32
Key words: Prolonged Terrorist Attacks, Financial Risk, Financial Markets, Stock Price
1 Introduction
After the 9/11 attacks, globally terrorist activities have increased by 23% per year (GTD,
2013). Pakistan has paid a very high price for being a front line ally in “War on Terror” and
the people of Pakistan have been the main target of terrorist attacks. Since joining of Pakistan
in “War on Terror”, terrorist activities in the country have escalated many fold. According to
GTD since January 1, 1991 till December 31, 2011 there had been 5211 terrorist attacks out of
which there had been 1610 terrorist attacks till before 9/11 and after 9/11 till December,2011
there had been 3601 terrorist attacks in Pakistan. Government has not paid enough attention
to resolve the root causes of terrorism, resulting in a stress on Pakistani economy and people
of the country (Shahbaz, 2013).
As terrorism is a tactic designed to set in oppressiveness and fear aimed to attain a religious,
political, economic, or social objective. It is defined as an action with a purpose with focused
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Table 1: Terrorist Events, 2002(Jan) to 2011(Dec)
Year Rank Incidents Fatalities Injuries
Property
Damaged
2002 11 40 96 310 13
2003 10 29 119 181 10
2004 5 58 270 658 17
2005 7 65 78 257 32
2006 5 144 244 579 55
2007 2 196 1144 1983 72
2008 2 491 1008 1739 157
2009 2 650 1377 3417 308
2010 2 682 1519 2865 345
2011 2 910 1468 2459 458
on explicit targets spread over numerous geographical locations and are highly unpredictable.
Unlike other disasters where the predictions for the occurrence of such events are possible there
is a very little possibility of predicting terrorism; predominantly comprising the use of explosives
and the firearms . Moreover the reaction time after identification of a potential terrorist event
is substantially limited as compare to other disasters. This innate suddenness of terrorist events
may initiate societal reaction by disrupting markets.
The act of terrorism on the target population and its impact on its economy has not been
consistent or straightforward in instilling fear and uncertainty in the besieged population. In-
vestors’ confidence and financial market instability has been used widely as an indicator of fear
owing to terrorism. (Eldor & Melnick, 2004; Arin, Ciferri, & Spagnolo, 2008; Shahbaz, Shabbir,
Malik, & Wolters, 2013). The terrorist attack of 9/11 on World Trade Center, the financial and
economical hub of the United States has been successful in short-term terror objectives and
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) trading operations remained inactive for whole week till 17
September and in the intervening week the Dow Jones fall by 14 percent(Lenain, Bonturi, &
Koen, 2002).
Similarly when terrorist attacked in Bali island on 12 October, 2002 through suicide bomber
and a car bomb and killed 202 people mostly tourist and injured 240. Indonesia stock market
noted consistent negative impact on the first trading day and it dropped by 25.53%. The sector
analyses showed that on the first day of trading the investors’ capital reduced between 3.28%
and 8.39% and remain persistently negative for five days (Ramiah & Graham, 2013).
In contrast, on 7th July 2005 early morning; when terrorists steered multiple bombings in
London killing 52 civilians and injuring over 700, the worst terrorist incident in the history of
United Kingdom since 1988 Lockerbie bombing and first ever suicide attack in the country, the
London Stock Exchange (LSE) somewhat remained uninterrupted, besides, initial decline in
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FTSE 100 ( London stock index) to approximately four percent, it adjusted to the shock and
trading continued to closed down to only 1.6 percent. The varying reactions of the LSE and
NYSE encourage to inquire whether terrorism impact financial markets or they are relatively
insensitive to terrorist incidents. Moreover, if financial markets are sensitive to act of terrorism,
are the effects momentary?
These studies suggest that the fear of terrorism can inhibit investors from making invest-
ment decision freely and societal confidence gets weaken. It also follows, that when terrorism
becomes a frequent part of the environment, investor confidence may not be affected and mar-
ket continued function normally. Consequently, fear from terrorism wear away when it becomes
a routine element over time and financial traders discounted in financial markets. Effects of
ongoing terrorism on the economy of a country were assessed in numerous studies Shahbaz
(2013); Alam (2013); Suleman (2012); Arin et al. (2008); Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004); Eldor
and Melnick (2004); and have revealed immediate daily reaction of financial markets to the act
of terrorism. Whilst negative effects have been associated with a single terrorist act, answer to
the significance of prolonged terrorism involving mass casualty are less clear. Societal adapta-
tion to a man made disaster (terrorism) or natural disaster, may lead to the “normalization”
of routine life and subsequent recovery of economic decision making. This paper seeks answer
to the following questions.
• RQ1: What are the of consequences of prolonged terrorism on stock markets?
• RQ2: Do terrorist attacks have an industry differential effect?
2 Literature Review
Since the involvement in “War on Terror” the gravest problem Pakistan is facing; is terrorism.
Since 9/11 till Dec,2011 there had been 3601 terrorist attacks including all types (GTD,2013).
These attacks have directly damaged the economy of the country by dropping FDI, threatening
the confidence of domestic investors, and upsetting financial markets, successively in lowering
economic growth, increasing unemployment and further poverty (Shahbaz, 2013)
Alam (2013) explore the relationship between terrorist activities in Pakistan and the stock
market movement by using “Terrorism Impact Factor”, developed to study the overall impact of
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terrorist activities, rather than an event study. No significant relationship found between stock
market returns and terrorism in the short run however in long run terrorism impact negatively
on stock returns.
Aslam and Kang (2013) using KSE-100 index time series daily data and terrorist attack news
spanned over year 2000 to 2012 investigated the affect of 300 terrorist attacks on stock market
of Karachi-Pakistan . Results indicate that the terrorist attacks have significant negative effects
on KSE-100 index on the day of attack and one day before the attack however this effect is
short lived. Empirical findings also indicated that the impact of attack varied across locations,
types and severity of attacks.
Essaddam and Karagianis (2013) investigated the affect of terrorism on stock return volatil-
ity of American firms targeted by terrorist attacks. Act of terrorism was identified as an
important risk factor in explaining the volatility of stock returns. Using an event-study ap-
proach and bootstrapping technique it was found that volatility increases on the day of the
attack and remain significant for at least fifteen days following the day of the attack showing
lingering effect. This effect differs according to the country characteristics in which the incident
occurred. It was also found that firms operating in wealthier, or more democratic countries,
face greater volatility in stock returns relative to firms operating in developing countries.
Ramiah and Graham (2013) using event study methodology probed how Indonesian equity
market reacted to the terrorist attacks on USA (9/11), London (7/7), Spain, India and even
Indonesia. Results show that equity portfolios were adversely affected by the September 11
attacks and Bali bombings. Domestic terrorist attack also had negative impact on Indonesian
capital market where as no significant impact of London, Madrid and Mumbai terrorist attacks
on Indonesian capital market were noted.
Graham and Ramiah (2012) used an adaptive expectations hypothesis and event study
methodology to estimate the impact of five terrorist attacks (9/11, Bali, Madrid, London and
Mumbai) on all sectors listed in Japanese stock markets. Parametric and non-parametric tests
were used to investigate whether the systematic risk and returns were affected by these events.
In general increase in systematic risk of some Japanese industries were documented whilst
strong negative impact on returns were recorded for most of the industries on the first day of
trading following the 9/11 attacks.
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Chesney, Reshtar, and Karaman (2011) investigated the impact of 77 terrorist events that
happened in 25 countries on their financial market indices. Twelve years financial market’s
daily price Indices starting from 4 Jan, 1994 till 16 Sep, 2005 was used and behavior of stocks,
bonds and the commodity market was analyzed using an event-study approach. They find
terrorist attacks significantly affect European, American, Swiss, and global markets. Along the
same line Kollias, Papadamou, and Stagiannis (2011) used event study methodology to examine
the impact terrorist attacks of March 11th, 2004 in Madrid and July 7th, 2005 in London; the
two major terrorist events on three major stock exchanges is Spain (Madrid, Valencia and
Barcelona) and the London stock exchange. Empirical findings point to similar reactions on
the event day, but noted significantly different recovery periods (in days) are needed for stock
markets to rebound and further the negative effects were short-lived.
Drakos (2010) examined whether terrorism exerts a significant negative impact on daily
stock market returns in a sample of 22 countries. In contrast to previous research which
focused on selected major terrorist acts, it tested for overall terrorist activity, it also explores
whether this effect is a function of the level of psychosocial impact caused by terrorist incidents.
The results supported negative returns on the day of a terrorist attack, which further amplify
with the increase in psychosocial effects.
Brounrn and Derwall (2010) examined the effects of major significant terrorist attacks on
stock markets of major economies of the world. Using event study method their analytical
results suggested that terrorist attacks effect stock prices mildly negative. They compared
these price reactions to those from natural unanticipated disaster, earthquakes, and concluded
that price declines following terror attacks are more pronounced. However, in both cases it
bounced back within a first week of the aftermath. Comparison of price responses of different
industries showed different reactions and were strongest for the local markets. Results suggested
that financial industry reacted strongly to terror events but recovered swiftly except for 9/11
attacks which caused long-term effects on financial industry.
Ramiah, Cam, Calabro, Maher, and Ghafouri (2010) investigated the impact of five terrorist
attacks (9/11, Bali, Madrid, London and Mumbai) on different sectorial equities listed on the
Australian Stock Exchange. Significant short term negative abnormal returns reported around
the 9/11 attacks and to a lesser extent, the Madrid and London bombings. Further weak
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positive equity response to the Bali bombing, and no response from the Mumbai attack in the
Australian market was observed.
Peleg, Regens, Gunter, and Jaffel (2011) find that prolonged terrorism may affect society’s
resiliency and sensitivity, they find Israel’s financial market remained sensitive to each act of
terrorism but have shown sustained psychological resilience and indicated no apparent overall
market shift. Which is an evidence of erosion of sensitivity to prolonged terrorism. In other
words, “normalisation of terror” was observed following an extended period of continued suicide
bombings.
Cam (2008) studied the impact of the 9/11, Bali and Madrid bombings on 135 industry eq-
uity indexes in the United States using event study method. The empirical evidence showed that
industries reacted differently to terrorism. Following 9/11, Airline, hotel and leisure industries
recorded negative abnormal returns whilst water, defense and telecommunications industries
showed positive abnormal returns, which confirms with Bruck and Wickstrom (2004). Bali
and Madrid attacks had little impact on the US industry equity returns, suggesting that US
industries were only moderately sensitive to these attacks.
Garvey and Mullins (2008) studied the London Financial Market with focus on terrorist
events carried out during 1998 to 2004 and examined how they have been perceived among
participants of the London financial market. Financial options was used as a measurement tool
for measuring terrorist risk perception.If risk amplification/attenuation is occurring one would
expect to see changing levels of demand in the options markets. Data from the London options
market suggested a high degree of sensitivity to terrorist events and it reveals a vulnerability
in the financial markets.
Eldor and Melnick (2004) studied the impact of suicide attacks (on Jewish population)
on financial markets, results exhibited long run effect of suicide attacks on financial markets.
They also find no evidence for market unresponsiveness to terror attack over time and financial
markets continued to incorporate NEWS related terror attacks as they occur efficiently.
Following literature review, we can assume that investors not necessarily react negatively
to terrorist attacks. Investors tend to respond negatively only when they perceive an increase
in the expected risk and market players may react if they perceive that the terrorist attack
will have an impact on expected returns. Further it is possible that stock markets do not react
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negatively on days surrounding a major terrorist attack however we believe that markets can
respond differently to the different attacks and that the variability in risk and returns differs
significantly across different sectors within an economy.
Many studies have investigated the relationship between terrorism in Pakistan and other
aspects of Pakistan economy. Previous research in this area falls roughly into two groups. The
first group of studies tests the main determinants of terrorism in Pakistan. Papers in second
groups examine the effects of terrorism on economic growth. A brief review of these studies is
presented in the following paragraphs.
Shahbaz et al. (2013) used an economic reasons for the increase of terrorism in Pakistan
rather than focusing on the political and institutional factors on terrorism. Capital and trade
openness were integrated with economic growth to explore the causal relationship between
terrorism and economic growth. Long-run relationship and direction of causality between the
variables were tested. Empirical results confirmed a long-run relationship between economic
growth, terrorism, capital, and trade openness. The bidirectional causality is found between
capital and terrorism, capital and trade openness, and trade openness and terrorism. The
unidirectional causality was noted running from economic growth to terrorism.
Shahbaz (2013) using annual data from 1971 to 2010 investigated the relationships between
terrorism, economic growth and inflation. The analytical results demonstrated long-run link-
ages between terrorism, economic growth and inflation in Pakistan; further it revealed that an
increase in inflation will escalate terrorism whilst economic growth also contribute in escalating
terrorism. Beside this bidirectional causality was also noted for inflation and terrorism. Con-
sequently it is concluded that lowering the inflation will reduce terrorism. Further it deduce
some problems for policy-makers in their quest for economic growth as growth would result in
an increase in terrorism activities.
Raza and Jawaid (2013) investigated the impact of terrorism on tourism in Pakistan by using
annual time series data from the period of 1980 to 2010. Empirical evidences confirmed long
run negative relationship between terrorism and tourism and also confirmed the unidirectional
causal relationship between terrorism and tourism; where causality runs from terrorism to
tourism.
7
3 Data and Modelling
Base on literature review it is identified that the earlier research can be divided into two
categories, event-studies: where behavior of the financial markets were studied for the period
around i.e. before and after the occurrence of terrorist events (Essaddam and Karagianis (2013);
Graham and Ramiah (2012); Aslam and Kang (2013); Chesney et al. (2011); Peleg et al. (2011);
Drakos (2010); Eldor and Melnick (2004)) and terrorism index-studies: where the impact of
terrorism on financial markets were studied through country specific terrorism index (Alam
(2013); Arin et al. (2008)). Further these index were constructed on subjectively determination
of terrorist events by researcher which may raise doubts about their being unbiased.
To study the impact of terrorism on financial market of Pakistan where non-stop series of
act of terrorism are occurring all over the country; event study methodology will not be able
to accurately estimate the risk associated with each of the event. However there is a need to
have a study which can envisions the overall impact of terrorist activities, not just a single
activity, or selected numbers of activities index as in earlier mentioned type of studies. To fill
this gap and to have a holistic picture of impact of terrorism on financial market of Pakistan we
constructed an index similar to (GTD (Global Terrorism Database) (2013) ‘Incidents over time:
search results’. GTD, University of Maryland, College Park, MD , 2013) and called it terrorism
impact factor with Lingering Effect (TIFL). For this index, impact factor for every terrorist
incident that occurred during the studied period and are listed in the database of GTD(2013)
was calculated and a monthly series of TIFL was developed for testing the hypothesis.
3.1 Data
Financial data: We used monthly stock price data from Datastream over the period 2002(Jan)
– 2011(Dec), for a total of 120 observations for 13 industries.
Terrorism data: For the second data set we fabricated a new terrorism impact factor index
using publicly available information on terrorist event mainly provided by Global Terrorism
Database (GTD, 2013). The terror events that occurred during the weekend are summed up
to the last Friday’s figure. Data cover all terrorist events that occurred in the sampled period
from 2002(Jan) to 2011(Dec). In earlier researches mostly event-study methodology is used
to evaluate the effect of terrorist events (Brown and Warner, 1980; Chen and Siembs, 2004;
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Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003). Further where index are constructed researcher subjectively
determined terrorist events for the construction of their index ((Chesney et al., 2011; Aslam &
Kang, 2013)). We used monthly terror index, which was constructed using all terrorist activities
that have taken place from 2002(Jan) to 2011(Dec) listed in Global Terrorism Database (GTD).
GTD recorded 3061 events during the mentioned time period. Using GTD Terrorism Index
scoring method daily terror index (relative impact of incidents)was constructed and later on
converted into monthly terror impact factor index. There are four factors counted in monthly
score:
• Number of terrorist events occurred in a particular month.
• Number of fatalities due to terrorist events in a particular month.
• Number of injuries caused by terrorist events in a particular month.
• Estimated level of property damage from terrorist events in a particular month.
Each of the factors is weighted differently; the daily terror index is defined as the sum of 3
* number of human casualties + 0.5 * number of people injured + number of terrorist attacks
+ 2 * level of total property damage 1 occurred each day which was later on converted into
monthly. Finally five month weighted average is applied to importantly reflect the lingering
psychological effect of terrorist acts over time.
Figure 1 shows the severity and intensity of the terrorism impact factor. The height of the
bars indicate the severity whereas intensity can be observed by the density of the bars. It can
be observer that after 2007 the severity and intensity both has increased drastically.
3.2 Model
The aim of this study is to test the impact of prolonged terrorist attacks on overall stock market
through its index and on different industries listed in Karachi stock exchange. The basic model
we used for this research is given below:
SP = TIFL+ I + t (1)
1Incident causing less than US$1 million are accorded a weighting of 1, between $1 million and $1 billion a
2, more than $1 billion a 3 and zero for unknown level of property damage level
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Figure 1: Terror Impact Factor with Lingering Effect
Where SP represents the total market index/sector index, TIFL (Terrorism Impact Factor
with Lingering Effect) is the focus variable of the study; I represents the set of control variables
in the model, comprising foreign direct investment(fdi) 2, net portfolio investment (pi) 3 and
remittances (rem).
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF)unit root test is used to examine the stationary properties
for time series variables. Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test is based on equation given
below:
∆Yt = α + βT +
´
γYt−1 +
k∑
j=1
δj∆Yt−j + t
Where ∆Yt is for the first difference of the time series Yt, α is the constant, β is the coefficient
of time trend, k is the maximum lags order of the autoregressive process and t is the error
term also known as white noise. ADF test provides cumulative distribution of ADF statistics.
Augment Dicky Fuller (ADF) test determines whether the estimate γ = 0 or γ < 0. The series
is said to be stationary if the test statistic is less than the critical values from fuller table.
Johansen and Jeuuselius J.J (1990) and Auto Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) cointe-
gration methods are used to examine the long run relationship between tif lt and xit. The J.J.
cointegration test is based on λTrace and λmax statistics. First “trace test” cointegration rank
2(Pilinkus, 2009)
3(Jawaid & Haq, 2012)
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‘r‘ is as follow:
λTrace = −T
n∑
j=r+1
ln(1− λj)
Second, λMax maximum number of cointegrating vectors against r + 1 is presented in the
following way:
λMax(r, r + 1) = −T ln(1− λj)
Where λMax the maximum eigenvalue statistic test the null hypothesis that there are r
cointegrating relations against the alternative hypothesis that there are r + 1 cointegrating
relations in the system. The λTrace the trace statistic tests the null hypothesis that there are at
most r cointegrating relations in the system, against the alternative of m that is, the number of
cointegrating vectors is less than or equal to r. ‘T ′ is the sample size, ln is the logarithm, and
λj is the eigenvalue. The critical values for the λMax and λTrace test statistics are tabulated in
Pesaran et al. (2000).
If there is one cointegrating vector for each model, it shall be identified by normalising
Market index for overall market model response and by normalising Sector Index for each
sector model. The cointegrating vector is normalised based on the argument that (overall
market and sector) indices of a stock market can be estimated using equation 1.
4 Empirical results
In this section the results of the casual relations between terrorism; measured through newly
developed terrorism index TIFL and stock prices are reported and discussed.
The results of the ADF unit root test statistics are reported in Table 2. The lag length used
to estimate the ADF unit root. Test statistics is based on the Akaike Info criterion. All studied
variables are found to be non-stationary at level and stationary at first difference, which hold
for the existence of unit root in all variables.
The results of the cointegrating vectors are reported in Table3. λTrace and λMax test statistics
are computed with unrestricted intercepts and no trends in VAR. For overall market index, the
λTrace and λMax test statistics show that there is one cointegrating vector at the 5% significance
level and similarly it also exist for all studied sectors at 5%. In general, existence of one
cointegrating vector for all indicies is not rejected. This study normalises the cointegrating
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vector by Xit indicies.
Table 2: Stationarity Test Results
variables
Level Difference
C C&T C C&T
ER 1.141 -1.918 -5.409 -7.901
FDI -1.743 -1.714 -10.152 -10.117
PI -1.774 -1.830 -2.952 -4.049
REM 1.306 -2.731 -4.323 -5.213
TIFL -1.734 -3.319 -15.181 -15.118
Market Index -0.207 -1.304 -8.857 -8.861
Oil & Gas 0.665 -1.145 -8.729 -8.838
Auto & Parts -0.371 -1.955 -9.120 -9.127
Industrial -1.838 -1.835 -7.776 -7.746
Utilities -0.683 -1.257 -9.600 -9.606
Consumer -2.385 -2.597 -7.740 -7.811
Tobacco -1.674 -1.655 -8.590 -8.575
Chemical -0.002 -2.366 -7.955 -7.997
Financial -1.507 -1.583 -8.257 -8.226
Health & Care -0.912 -1.445 -8.052 -8.030
Telecom -1.842 -1.983 -10.230 -10.246
Travel & Leisure -1.436 -2.277 -8.438 -8.414
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Table 3: Cointegration Test Results
Model
Nul Hypothesis
No. of CE(s)
Trace
Statistics
5% Critical
values
Max-Eigen
Statistic
5% Critical
values
Market Index None 109.509 95.753 44.661 40.077
At Most 1 64.847 69.818 29.229 33.876
At Most 2 35.618 47.856 16.902 27.584
Oil & Gas None 109.467 95.753 42.354 40.077
At Most 1 67.113 69.818 26.009 33.876
At Most 2 41.104 47.856 19.260 27.584
Utilities None 137.303 95.753 62.662 40.077
At Most 1 74.641 69.818 40.259 33.876
At Most 2 34.382 47.856 16.914 27.584
Auto & Parts None 116.548 95.753 43.283 40.077
At Most 1 73.264 69.818 28.939 33.876
At Most 2 44.325 47.856 18.874 27.584
Consumer None 97.338 95.753 40.707 40.077
At Most 1 56.631 69.818 23.480 33.876
At Most 2 33.150 47.856 13.630 27.584
Industrial None 107.132 95.753 45.964 40.077
At Most 1 61.167 69.818 27.287 33.876
At Most 2 33.879 47.856 10.892 27.584
Tobacco None 178.133 95.753 75.344 40.077
At Most 1 102.789 69.818 60.168 33.876
At Most 2 42.620 47.856 22.406 27.584
Chemical None 153.947 95.753 63.599 40.077
At Most 1 90.348 69.818 38.155 33.876
At Most 2 52.193 47.856 28.534 27.584
Financial None 191.984 95.753 86.270 40.077
At Most 1 105.713 69.818 63.952 33.876
At Most 2 41.760 47.856 19.280 27.584
Health & Care None 184.733 95.753 75.847 40.077
At Most 1 108.886 69.818 63.871 33.876
At Most 2 45.015 47.856 20.737 27.584
Telecom None 149.656 95.753 75.745 40.077
At Most 1 73.911 69.818 43.206 33.876
At Most 2 30.705 47.856 13.376 27.584
Travel & Leisure None 141.259 95.753 69.353 40.077
At Most 1 71.905 69.818 34.780 33.876
At Most 2 37.125 47.856 15.367 27.584
Normalised cointegrating vectors are reported in Table4. The likelihood ratio test statistic
is used to test that the coefficient of explanatory variable is zero. The results of the likelihood
statistic are rejected mostly at the 1, 5 or 10 percent level. Therefore the explanatory variables
are generally important to be included in the estimation.
Table 4 summarize the empirical results for prolong terrorist attacks, measured through
terrorist impact factor with lingering effect, evidence of significant negative as well as positive
impact are found for different industries.
The results reported show a significant negative effect on overall Market and Oil&Gas.
The negative effect specifies that, besides personal injuries and the loss of lives of targeted
population, the terror attacks also have economic costs which reduce firms’ expected profits.
Further it indicates that industries with a negative reaction to domestic terrorism are more are
more susceptible to overseas assaults.
However four industries Financial, Consumer, Tobacco and Healt&Care exhibited statisti-
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cally significant positive relationship with the stock price. The financial industry index which
includes insurance and banks as sub-industries had the highest positive coefficient.
This result was expected as terrorist risk prolonged and increased after engaging in war on
terror, leading to further demand for insurance. Also after the events of 9/11 Pakistan assumed
a wide range of dangerous responsibilities for the international campaign against terrorism and
received substantial assistance. Pakistan’s debt was unscheduled for 28 years, which provided
a relief of about $1 billion a year in debt servicing. Strict scrutiny of Muslim bank accounts
holders of foreign bank in Western countries impelled Pakistanis to repatriate their foreign
accounts back to Pakistan, mainly through official channels. As a result, remittances went
up. Private investors in the Middle East also felt that it would be less risky to invest their
surplus capital in Pakistan than in Europe and America. These external factors increased bank
deposits and its profitability.
Finally for Consumer, Tobacco and Health&Care industries there seems no obvious reason
for this positive movement but it could be that, these industries, were perceived as a ‘refuge’
industries, comparable to other risky industries. Showing the investor sentiments in shifting
their investment to less risky asset during the periods of high risk events (Liu, Longstaff, &
Pan, 2003).
Table 4: Results of the Normalized Cointegration Vectors
Model ER FDI PI REM TIFL
Market Index Coefficient -2.256 1.327*** 2.310*** 1.267*** -0.771***
t-statistics -0.288 4.896 3.071 3.151 -2.988
Oil & Gas Coefficient 7.377 2.547** 10.330*** 5.753*** -4.323***
t-statistics 0.232 2.338 3.472 3.440 -4.089
Utilities Coefficient -8.409 -2.230*** 9.806*** 0.317 0.367
t-statistics 0.468 4.684 8.198 0.351 -0.672
Auto & Parts Coefficient 9.003 1.666** 10.945*** 2.668** -1.443*
t-statistics 0.380 2.155 4.513 2.130 -1.908
Consumer Coefficient 49.697** -0.284 11.732*** -0.203 2.983**
t-statistics 1.755 -0.297 4.556 -0.140 -3.285
Industrial Coefficient 8.127 0.164 2.822*** 0.156 -0.883**
t-statistics 1.053 0.650 4.060 0.406 -3.532
Tobacco Coefficient -6.890 2.564*** 11.619*** -0.613 2.637***
t-statistics -0.459 6.540 10.505 -0.814 5.757
Chemical Coefficient -20.922 -2.130*** 10.591*** 1.389 0.725
t-statistics -1.115 -4.201 8.197 1.472 1.241
Financial Coefficient -97.825*** 7.157*** 8.891*** 2.183** 4.119***
t-statistics -5.198 14.256 6.766 2.334 7.151
Health & Care Coefficient -4.639 0.713*** 1.614*** -0.087 0.518***
t-statistics -1.518 8.912 8.110 -0.583 5.630
Telecom Coefficient 2.545 11.371*** -38.075*** 2.184 -0.093
t-statistics 0.040 6.535 -8.748 0.688 -0.048
Travel & Leisure Coefficient 152.541 -13.866*** 54.363*** -0.829 1.258
t-statistics 1.654 -5.725 8.944 -0.179 0.447
* Test statistic significant at the 0.10 level ** Significant at the 0.05 level *** Significant at the 0.01 level
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the effect of terror attacks; measured through Terrorism Impact
Factor with lingering effect on stock price of listed companies in Karachi Stock Exchange
(KSE). Our investigation exhibits that over the studied period of ten years (2002 to 2012)
both intensity and severity of the terrorist events fluctuated stock prices differently, listed in
different sectors of KSE 100 index. A long term relation between them were also eminent which
reject the plausible idea of terrorism becoming part of the routine life i.e. “Normalisation of
Terror”. Moreover it indicates that market is efficient in integrating the terror news and remain
unsuccessful to accumulate evidence supporting unresponsiveness to terror attack over time.
Consequently it is concluded that Karachi stock market is functioning in an efficient way.
This paper also tested the impact of terrorist attack on different industries listed in KSE
100 index. It was noted that different industries responded differently to terrorism. Some
industries experienced decrease in price while others recorded increase, the financial, tobacco
and health & care saw prices rising. In contrast, oil & gas, auto & parts, industrial, telecoms
experienced fall in prices. The analytical results of this paper highlighted the similarities that
exist between TIFL and risky events. Likewise this paper also provide some clues for investors
desiring to reduce risk related to terrorism through industry diversification.
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